Unrecognized States

Recent reports claim that the incoming Trump administration is considering giving diplomatic recognition to Somaliland, a de facto independent state that broke away from the wreckage of Somalia in 1991. Republican representative Scott Perry of Pennsylvania has already introduced a bill (H.R.10402) to formally acknowledge the sovereignty of the unrecognized country. Proponents note that Somaliland is the most stable and democratic state in the Horn of Africa, having recently held an election in which the opposition scored a major victory and smoothly assumed power. Somaliland is also seen as a potential U.S. ally in a troubled and strategic region near the entrance to the Red Sea. As a recent Semafor article notes:

Recognizing Somaliland could enable US intelligence to set up long term operations to monitor the movement of weapons in a volatile region as well as keep an eye on Chinese activity. China already has a permanent military base in neighboring Djibouti. It should allow the US to better monitor Houthi activity in Yemen.

The same article, however, warns that the recognition of Somaliland could have dangerous consequences, potentially destabilizing the larger region:

If Trump does recognize Somaliland it will likely be disruptive to the Horn of Africa region —which includes Somalia, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea — say US-Africa watchers…  “Recognizing Somaliland would undoubtedly rattle the rump state of Somalia, further destabilize the Horn, and elicit a sharp rebuke from the African Union,” argues Ken Opalo, a political science professor at Georgetown University.

Regardless of Somaliland’s possible recognition, the Horn of Africa already seems to be undergoing “further” destabilization. Somalia slipped once again into constitutional crisis in early 2024 when its central government sought to recentralize authority, in particular by moving from its clan-based electoral system to one of universal suffrage, which was seen as a threat by important clan leaders. As a result, the autonomous region of Puntland in the north withdrew its support of the federal government and declared its own independence, although most observers see this more as a negotiating bid than an actual secession effort. The crisis intensified in November 2024 after a regional election in Jubaland, the southernmost of Somalia’s federal states. The Mogadishu government rejected the election because it had been conducted under the old clan-based system. A judge in Jubaland then accused Somalia’s president of treason, provoking a federal charge of treason against Jubaland’s reelected president. Federal armed forces were then dispatched to Jubaland to assert central power. They were roundly defeated, however, by Jubaland’s militia, the so-called Dervish Force. Hundreds of Somali soldiers were captured while others fled into Kenya.

Struggles with its own autonomous federal states are not the only threat to Somalia’s largely imaginary national unity and territorial integrity – or to regional “stability.” Islamist insurgents belonging to or affiliated with Al Shabaab, who reject Somali nationhood, control several territorial enclaves of uncertain extent. (Maps of Islamist control vary widely from source to source and from time to time). Insurgent activity is growing, especially in Puntland. Voice of America reports that Islamic State (IS) forces in Somalia, ultimately aiming for global jihad, have doubled their numbers in recent months. A recent Bloomberg article notes that “Islamic State’s presence in Puntland ‘has been central to IS’s global financial and operational network, so the impact of its actions will be global…’” Meanwhile, piracy, most of its also linked to Puntland, also appears to be rebounding.

Although acknowledging Somaliland’s independence could conceivably exacerbate the region’s troubles, it also has the potential to function in a stabilizing manner, considering the chaos engulfing the rest of Somalia. Daniel Haile and Will Childers cogently juxtapose Somaliland’s “relative success in democratic governance” with the instability, brutality, and despotism found in neighboring (recognized) states, arguing that its failure to gain international recognition is “perplexing.”

Perplexing though it may seem, Somaliland’s orphan status is understandable from the perspective of diplomatic sensitivities. The United States has pursued a “one Somalia” policy for much the same reason that it maintains a “one China” policy, even though both rely on a fundamental falsification of geopolitical reality and to some extent run counter to U.S. strategic interests. Although the United States maps Taiwan as part of China, it would be horrified if Beijing were to make that map reflect reality by conquering the island. But officially recognizing Taiwan’s independence would infuriate Beijing for little gain, just as recognizing Somaliland’s independence would anger other African countries. The African Union insists that existing boundaries, inappropriate though they may be, must be regarded as sacrosanct.* Otherwise, the conventional argument has it, border clashes and secessionist insurgencies could quickly crop up across the continent. Such conflicts are, of course, already rife over much of Africa, but they could conceivably intensify if existing boundaries were called into question.

Diplomatic fiction plays an important role in smoothing international relation. Maintaining that Somaliland is still part of Somalia is thus a reasonable, if contestable, position. But taking such pretense out of the diplomatic realm and ensconcing it in public discourse is a more fraught gambit, one that muddies our understanding of how global politics functions. It is hardly surprising that the United Nations Security Council has recently reaffirmed its “full respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia,” even though Somalia has no territorial integrity or national unity that one could respect. But it is unreasonable for a supposedly educational Wikipedia article to claim that “Somalia is a federal republic consisting of 6 federal member states. … Somaliland, Puntland, Galmudug, Hirshaabelle, South West, and Jubland.” Although independent since 1960, Somalia did not become a Federal Republic until 2012, twenty-one years after the de facto independence of Somaliland. “Somalia” thus “consists” of six member states only in the diplomatic imagination.

Since its 1991 collapse, the government of Somalia has been undertaking measures designed to restore its territorial integrity and national unity, such as adopting its “widely hailed” federal constitution in 2012. Steadfast believers in the existing international order have thus convinced themselves that the country’s disunion is temporary, and that Somalia will eventually be restored to its position as an integral member of the global community of nations. That possibility, however, is looking increasingly dim – and not just because of the potential U.S. recognition of Somaliland. Perhaps the time has come to drop the pretense of Somaliland’s national unity and territorial integrity and acknowledge the reality of Somaliland’s independence. Considering the recent developments outlined in this post, it seems a bit of a stretch to argue that the possible U.S. recognition of Somaliland would have worrisomely “destabilizing” effects across the Horn of Africa. Somaliland is currently something of an island of stability in a sea of disorder. But despite its capable and reasonably democratic government, Somaliland faces its own serious geopolitical challenges, as the next GeoCurrents post will explore.

*The exception is when both sides in a conflict agree to allow a secessionist state to gain independence, as occurred in 2011 when South Sudan gained sovereignty and was quickly recognized by the international community. This development, needless to say, did not generate peace and stability in either Sudan or South Sudan. But South Sudan, unlike Somaliland, did not have a multi-decade experience as an effective and reasonably democratic state.