In late September 2026, the Yemeni journalist Hussain Albukhaiti, a Houthi-aligned commentator based in Sanaa, publicly asserted Yemeni claims to the Saudi provinces of Najran, Jizan, and Asir, claiming they will be conquered and annexed if the current war escalates. His unrealistic statement fits a long pattern of Houthi-linked rhetoric treating the three provinces, which were ceded to Saudi Arabia under the 1934 Treaty of Taif, as occupied Yemeni land. According to Wikipedia, the treaty gave Saudi Arabia only “temporary sovereignty” over these lands, but the Saudi government regards its control as permanent.
Currently, the Houthis control most of western Yemen, the most densely populated part of the country. They claim, however, to be the legitimate authority for the entire country. As a result, the Houthis reject southern secessionism and present themselves as defenders of Yemeni unity and sovereignty against external (especially Saudi and U.S.) influence, while running an authoritarian administration that suppresses rivals inside their zone. The map posted below shows the current geopolitical reality along with Houthi dreams of expansion.
It is not coincidental that much of this territory is primarily inhabited by Shia Muslims. Only southern Asir and some interior portions of Jizan, however, are inhabited by followers of Zaidi Shia Islam, the sect of the Houthis. Najran is mostly inhabited by Sulaymani Ismailis, who follow a distinctly different branch of Shiism.
These two Shia sects differ significantly in their current interpretation of jihad. Zaidi ideology emphases resistance to tyranny but adds the modern political program of anti-Americanism, anti-Zionism, and alignment with Iran, as expressed in the slogan “God is great, death to America, death to Israel, a curse on the Jews, victory to Islam.” Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, founder of the Houthi movement, regarded armed jihad against the United States, Israel, and their allies as a religious priority. Ismaili traditions, in contrast, emphasize “greater Jihad,” or the internal struggle against the base desires of the self. Ismailis are associated with esoteric beliefs, and the largest Ismaili sect, that is the Nizaris, is noted for its liberalism, rationalism, emphasis on education, and cosmopolitanism.
It is difficult to say, however, what the Sulaymani Ismailis of Najran currently believe. Like other Ismailis, they have historically practiced taqiyya (or precautionary concealment of belief), understood as a practical response to persecution and a way to protect esoteric knowledge. Given the hostility of the Saudi government to Shia beliefs and practices, such concealment has become very important.