Discussions of economic and social development in India often raise the question of religious diversity. As the Wikipedia table reproduced above shows, India’s Muslim minority has a substantially lower literacy rate than its Hindu majority, as well as a higher birthrate. On average, Indian Muslims tend to be poorer than members of other religious communities. In fact, some are calling for Muslims to be included within India’s system of “reservations,” or quotas established for people of low-caste background in educational institutions and government employment. One official commission has recently advocated a 10 percent allotment for Muslims seeking government jobs, following a policy already established at the state level in southern India. As reported by the Times of India, “Tamil Nadu has 3.5 per cent reservation for Muslims within 27 per cent quota for backward castes, while Congress-ruled Andhra Pradesh has given 4 per cent reservation to Muslims, which was also upheld by the Supreme Court.”

Yet as the maps posted above indicate, there is no clear linkage in India between the geography of religion and that of development. On the one hand, almost half the country’s Muslims live in the three relatively poor north-central states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and West Bengal. Many educated Muslims from this area fled to Pakistan after the partition of British India in 1947, leaving behind the poorer segment of the community. But in many other parts of India, the social and economic standing of the Muslim community is substantially higher. Jammu and Kashmir, the country’s only Muslim-majority state, ranks relatively high on a number of socio-economic indicators. In Kerala, where a quarter of the population follows Islam, the Muslim literacy rate approaches 100 percent, tracking consistently with that of state’s Hindu and Christian communities.

As we have seen, Kerala’s development indicators are extremely high across the board. A generation ago, Kerala stood out even more starkly, having achieved elevated rates of literacy and public health—and low levels of fertility—well before other Indian states. Kerala’s achievements have often been credited to its history of socialist government, which has resulted in heavy investments in education and health. The “Kerala model of development,” however, has also been criticized for generating labor strife and staunching industrial growth, forcing many highly educated Keralites to seek employment elsewhere in India or abroad.

Although Kerala-style socialism resulted in considerable class tension, the state historically enjoyed calm relations among its religious groups (Kerala is roughly half Hindu, a quarter Muslim, and a fifth Christian). In recent years, however, religious conflict has intensified. On July 4, 2010, a Christian professor who had been accused of blasphemy by a prominent Muslim organization was attacked in broad daylight by an enraged mob, which cut off his right hand. One the same day, two men were arrested on suspicion of organizing the attack; both were connected with the Popular Front of India, a southern Indian Muslim organization with a reputation for extremism. Shortly afterward, local police launched several raids on offices connected with the group. In one, they “found bombs, swords, iron pipes and objectionable leaflets in a vacant building that was suspected to be used by Popular Front activists.”

On other recent occasions, Kerala’s Christian, Muslim, and Hindu religious leaders have found common cause in objecting to initiatives from the state’s secular political and educational establishments. A recent dispute focused on a social studies textbook that was deemed anti-religious. The objectionable passage, a brief dialogue set in a public school, is worth quoting in full (note that the father’s name is Muslim, the mother’s Hindu):

"Son, what's your name?"

"Jeevan."

"Good, nice name. Father's name?"

"Anvar Rasheed."

"Mother's name?"

"Lakshmi Devi."

The headmaster raised his head, looked at the parents and asked:

"Which religion should we write?"

"None. Write there is no religion."

"Caste?"

"The same."

The headmaster leaned back in his chair and asked a little gravely:

"What if he feels the need for a religion when he grows up?"

"Let him choose his religion when he feels so."

Several recent Geocurrents posts have addressed the status of women in India. Today we examine it more directly, using three indicators. The maps they generate, posted above, conform imperfectly to India’s basic geographical pattern of development, with several striking divergences.

The data used in the first map, “Currently Married Women Who Usually Participate in Household Decisions,” presumably refers to major household decisions, but even so the figures are distressingly low. The main bright spot is the extreme northeast, particularly the states of Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Manipur. Female empowerment in this region reflects its tribal background and Southeast Asian cultural affiliations. Women’s authority is pronounced in some northeastern ethnic groups. Among the Khasi, the largest ethnic group of Meghalaya, descent is traced in the female line, and women traditionally manage household affairs. The Wikipedia notes that “the Khasi have an unusual dedication toward matrilineal customs.” Or as one recent article inimitably puts it, “In Meghalaya, women enjoy pivotal liberty & independence. Many look after their own importance & earn their livelihood & great success... Hence … women's anticipation is evident in all its glory in Meghalaya's unique women centric community.”

The other major oddity in this map is the poor ranking of West Bengal, lowest in the country. West Bengal is not a prosperous state, but it does reasonably well on many social indices, and it is noted for its intellectual traditions and left-leaning electorate. That it would rank substantially lower than Bihar on such an important indicator seems bizarre. Minor oddities include the average results of the generally progressive states of Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Jammu and Kashmir, as well as the high showing of Assam.

In the second map, “Ever-Married Women Who Have Ever Experienced Spousal Violence,” Bihar reverts to its accustomed last place. Several other features of this map are also familiar: the far north does well, particularly Himachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir, as do Kerala and Goa in the south. Most unusual, however, is the strikingly low position of Tamil Nadu, where 41.9 percent of ever-married women are reported to have been victims of spousal violence. Another unexpected result is Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh besting Maharashtra. It is possible, however, that the data are inaccurate. Surveys respondents are not always fully representative, and there is often resistance to answering invasive questions. The answers solicited, moreover, reflect the skill and demeanor of those carrying out the research, which can vary from state to state.

In basic demographic matters such as sex ratio, by contrast, the data are solid. The sex ratio map posted here is a bit dated, but the basic patterns have not changed: the diffusion of sonograms and other technologies for fetal sex-selection has skewed sex ratios toward males across almost all of India. In 2001, only Kerala had more females than males; given the biologically determined longer life expectancy of women, this is what we would see everywhere were it not for deliberate interventions.

The most striking aspect of the sex ratio map is the location of the male-biased core zone, which straddles India’s basic developmental divide. The entire middle and upper Ganges basin forms the focal point of boy-preference, whether in the prosperous state of Punjab or in impoverished Uttar Pradesh. At a more local level, however, class and region interact in highly complex ways. According to one recent study, the lowest sex ratio in India – 707 females per 1000 males – is found among poor residents of the country’s wealthiest political subdivision, the Union Territory* of Chandigarh, which serves as the capital city of both Punjab and Haryana. Chandigarh, known as the “city beautiful” and famed for having been partially planned by the Swiss modernist Le Corbusier, is rated as India’s cleanest city, but its slums are rapidly expanding due to migration from surrounding rural areas.

India’s low sex ratios are a major national concern, leading to a number of proposed and enacted reforms. In July 2010, officials in Punjab announced that the number of girls (0 to 6 years of age) in the state per 1000 boys had increased from 798 in 2001 to 850 today. They attributed this gain to “the tough measures taken by the state government to ensure there was no violation of the Pre-Natal Diagnostic Technique (PNDT) Act” (which banned sex-selective abortion). Also of note is the “Save Our Daughters India Project,” launched on July 17, 2010 by A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, a former president of India.

*India’s highest-order political subdivisions are divided between its twenty-eight states, which are mapped here, and its seven much smaller and less autonomous union territories, which generally are not. In most cases, the data used to compile these maps did not include the union territories. A few maps, however, including the first two posted today, do show the National Capital Territory of Delhi, which is officially classified as a union territory.

One of the more unusual measurements of social development collected in the Indian National Family Health Survey and posted on the Wikipedia is that of “media awareness,” defined as the percentage of people in a given state “exposed to the media.” The data were collected separately for men and women, and providing a measure not just of exposure to the wider world but also of gender disparities.

The first map, showing male media exposure, fits India’s general developmental pattern relatively well. Southern India ranks high, especially the four states of the far south that speak Dravidian rather than Indo-European languages. The far northeast shows its typical variability. The high rates found in Mizoram correlate with that state’s elevated levels of literacy, attributable to the efforts of Protestant missionaries (roughly 75 percent of the state’s residents are Presbyterian). Manipur’s ranking, second highest in the country, is more difficult to explain. The map also shows some unusual features. In the progressive far north, Haryana comes in with an unexpectedly low figure. In the languishing north-central belt, the normal pattern is reversed, with Bihar and Uttar Pradesh outranking the states immediately to their south. The extremely low figures for Jharkhand, however, are not surprising. Jharkhand’s substantial mineral wealth inflates many of its developmental figures. But the state as a whole remains deeply impoverished, and its large tribal population (28 percent) includes many who live far beyond the reach of information technology.

The media exposure map for women is similar to that for men, although the disparity between “high” states and “low” states is more pronounced (note the adjusted numerical cut-off points in this map’s key). The overall impression is one of a reversed center-periphery dynamic, with high levels of television and radio exposure found in India’s extreme south, north, and east (Kerala, Jammu and Kashmir, and Manipur) and low levels in the central areas. Jharkhand’s and Bihar’s female media exposure rates in particular are shockingly low (at 39 and 41 percent respectively).

The final map highlights the gender discrepancies revealed by the first two maps. Three central-northern states stand out; here as with other indicators, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and Rajasthan show low levels of female empowerment, part of why they fare so poorly in terms of general social development.

To be sure, increased media exposure is not a purely positive development. Environmentalists decry it as a spur to consumerism, while advocates of cultural diversity warn of increasing uniformity. Not surprisingly, the spread of radio, television, and video has been linked to the “flagging fortunes of traditional and folk media, [including] street theater.”

Meanwhile, as usual, globalization provides its own “difference engine.” The media streaming into rural villages is not necessarily of Indian origin. In the far northeast, residents of Manipur and especially Nagaland are apparently tuning in to South Korean frequencies. Journalist Renchano Humtsoe is worth quoting on this issue at some length:

“Korean culture is flooding into Nagaland. New trade treaties between India and Korea facilitated the exchange of Korean goods and enabled them to enter Nagaland with greater ease. Additionally, Nagas have long felt neglected by the central Indian government. This is especially the case with Naga youth. Many believe this lack of identity with central India informs Nagas’ embrace of Korean culture. […] Naga youth have now started to adapt Korean culture. Korean television channels, programs, movies, and clothes are popular among Naga youth. Korean companies are looking into investing in Nagaland. The Nagaland State Government has even taken steps to embrace Korean culture: it hosts an annual Indian-Korean cultural festival.”

Electricity provision is a major issue in India. Almost half of rural houses are not served, and the basic infrastructure is woefully inadequate, with transmission losses of over 30 percent. According to the Wikipedia, electricity theft “amounts to 1.5 per cent of India’s GDP.” To be sure, India is responding, investing in conventional power as well as wind and solar generated electricity. In 2007, the Indian government optimistically announced plans to provide power to the entire population by 2012. But a July 3, 2010 article on electrification in Bihar concluded that progress to date has been “dismal,” noting that “out of the total target of 5,65,000 … household connections in 2010-11, the BSEB (Bihar State Electricity Board) has energized only 4,310 households till May this year.”

The map of electricity provision, compiled from survey data posted in Wikipedia, conforms relatively well to India’s basic development divide. Bihar, not surprisingly, lags behind all other Indian states, while Kerala and Goa in the south and Himachal Pradesh and Punjab in the far north come in with their usual high figures. The far northeast, especially Mizoram, fares better than usual, in part because its mountainous terrain facilitates hydroelectricity generation. In India’s poor north-central belt, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh perform above expectation, although several reports have claimed that Madhya Pradesh is failing to electrify its more remote villages. Still, it is notable that this poor state (with a 2006 per capita GDP of only $433) has made better progress on a number of other developmental fronts than its neighbors in the Hindi-speaking belt.*

The second map, showing households with television sets, corresponds still more closely to India’s developmental divide. All states in the center-north show low rates of ownership – with Bihar again coming in last – whereas all states in the south and far north exhibit relatively high rates. The “variable” far northeast, however, reports relatively low and uniform levels of television ownership.

The real standout on the map of television ownership is Andhra Pradesh, which places third in India despite being slightly below average in terms of per capita GDP. High rates of television ownership in Andhra Pradesh correlate with a particularly vibrant local entertainment industry. Hyderabad, the state’s capital, produces more feature-length films per year than any other Indian city, and follows only Mumbai (“Bollywood”) in movie revenues. Hyderabad’s films are in Telugu, Andhra Pradesh’s official language – giving rise to the nickname “Tollywood.” Tollywood movies are often dubbed into other languages, and many are distributed internationally. The local audience, however, is key. Telugu is India’s third most widely spoken language; with more than 75 million speakers, it ranks 15^th in the world, ahead of Vietnamese, Korean, and Italian.

The Telugu film industry has long had a reputation for being more disciplined, wholesome, and conservative than Bollywood, which is infamous for its ties to the criminal underworld. Evidently, times are changing in Hyderabad. According to a recent story in the Deccan Chronicle, “Now, whether it is the blind aping of Bollywood or exposure to ‘international’ lifestyles, the new breed of Telugu stars are experimenting with social narcotics.” Cocaine, evidently, is the drug of choice among wayward Tollywood celebrities.

As we saw previously, Andhra Pradesh’s fertility rate of 1.8 is extraordinarily low considering the state’s modest economic standing. Some observers have suggested a linkage between reduced fertility and access to mass electronic entertainment. According to a 2009 CNN report, “India's new health and welfare minister came out with an idea on how to tackle the population issue: Bring electricity to every Indian village so that people would watch television until late at night and therefore be too tired to make babies.” The American social scientists Robert Jensen and Emily Oster have argued that cable television reduces fertility in a different manner. Television shows, and soap operas in particular, they argue, enhance female status by showing rural women the more open and less sexist world of modern, urban, middle-class India. Unlike their counterparts in Bihar, most poor people in Andhra Pradesh are plugged into such modernity. To the extent that they emulate the modes of life that they see depicted on the screen, this may help account for Andhra Pradesh’s strikingly small families.

* Haryana is Hindi-speaking, but it developmental indicators are similar to those of neighboring Punjabi-speaking Punjab, to which it was once joined.

India’s map of per capita GDP conforms relatively well to the general patterns of Indian development outlined earlier this week, with higher figures in the south and far north, lower figures in the north-center, and mixed figures in the far northeast. A few deviations from this basic configuration, however, are worth noting.

In the areas deemed “progressive India,” several states, most notably Jammu and Kashmir and Andhra Pradesh, show lower than average levels of per capita GDP. In Jammu and Kashmir, the depressed showing can easily be attributed to perennial insurgency and civil strife. Andhra Pradesh is rather more complicated. This state contains some of India’s most technologically advanced areas, notably the city of Hyderabad (nicknamed “Cyberabad”), as well as some deeply impoverished rural areas. Such disparities have contributed to a movement to split the state. In terms of social development, however, Andhra Pradesh as a whole has made marked progress, rising to near the top in some measures of well-being.

The economic map posted above also deviates slightly from the basic developmental pattern in its pronounced east-west division, with western India posting substantially higher figures overall than eastern India. This configuration results in part from the strong showing of the western state of Gujarat, which ranks much higher on per capita GDP than on most measures of social development. Along with neighboring Maharashtra, Gujarat is India’s main center of heavy industry; it produces 39 percent of the country’s industrial output and 67 percent of its petrochemicals. Although a number of its social indicators lag below those of southern India, it has recently made steady progress in enhancing basic human well-being as well. But Gujarat is also noted for its Hindu nationalism—and Hindu-Muslim tensions. A strain of Hindu puritanism runs strong here; among other indicators, Gujarat is India’s only completely “dry” state, having banned the sale of alcoholic beverages.

In India’s poor north-central region, West Bengal stands out for its relatively high per capita GDP figures, which come close to the average for India as a whole. As we shall see over the next week, West Bengal has a number of relatively high social development indicators as well, making its placement in the “languishing India” category uncertain. Like Gujarat, it is noted for its heavy industries, and it is beginning to make a showing in high tech as well; it has also long been one of India’s main intellectual centers. But West Bengal still has huge disparities of wealth and pockets of pronounced deprivation, despite the fact that it has usually been governed by Marxist political parties. A major divide in the state currently pits market-oriented communists—who want to follow the Chinese path of development by courting international investment—against their more traditional comrades. Meanwhile, labor unrest may be stalling economic growth. The Tata Nano, the world’s cheapest production car (with a base price of $2,160) was scheduled to be built in West Bengal, but violent protests led the company to transfer production to Gujarat.

Bihar comes in last in per capita GDP, as its does across a range of social and economic indicators. Numerous reports indicate that Bihar has at long last turned a corner, reducing its notoriously high levels of corruption and making progress on a number of fronts. The 2008-2009 data actually shows Bihar as having India’s fastest growing economy, its GDP surging 11.44 percent. Some observers, however, remain skeptical, noting that most of the gains have resulted from infrastructural spending by the central government. Doubts also persist in regard to the basic data. As one recent report concludes, “Relying on the state’s data to rush to any conclusion would call for a heroic leap of faith.”

According to Oxford University’s recently released Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa have similar levels of intensive poverty, far higher than those found in other regions of the world. The same report shows that South Asia contains the world’s largest number of truly impoverished people. As the Hindustan Times reported on July 15, 2010, “there are more 'MPI poor' people in eight Indian states (421 million in Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal) than in the 26 poorest African countries combined (410 million).” Such a figure stems both from India’s huge population and from the fact that its impoverished population is more geographically concentrated than that of sub-Saharan Africa. While the Oxford report reveals an MPI poverty rate of 81 percent in the Indian state of Bihar, it also showed a rate of only 16 percent in the state of Kerala.

As a result of such regional disparities, generalizations about poverty, economic development, and social conditions in India can be highly misleading. Owing to its large size, vast population, and high levels of cultural diversity, India is more than just a country; like Europe, it is a subcontinent. Indian states are in most respects comparable to European countries. They cover similar territorial extents, have similar populations, and are marked by similar levels of socio-economic diversity. The state of Maharashtra, for example, contains 97 million people in 119,000 square miles (308,000 square kilometers), making it closely analogous to Germany, with its 82 million inhabitants spread over 138,000 spare miles (357,000 square miles).

Over the next week or so, Geocurrents will examine the spatial patterns of Indian development in some detail. Most of the maps that will appear are based on data from the comprehensive India National Health Survey 3, carried out in 2005-2006. Some of the relevant statistics are posted in the Wikipedia; others are accessible through the National Health Survey’s own webpages. Mapping at the state level, of course, still conceals considerable diversity, since conditions often vary significantly from district to district. But a cartographic analysis at the state level reveals striking patterns across India as a whole.

The various maps to be posted this week reveal a consistent developmental split within India, separating a zone of acute deprivation from areas of much greater social and economic development. The first map (above) presents a composite view of this basic divide, revealing a solid swath of territory across north-central India that lags behind the rest of the country. Southern India, Western India, and far northern India have exhibited rapid progress in recent decades, surging ahead of the north-center. The small states in far northeastern India, in contrast, show inconsistent patterns of development, with high and low scores jumbled together in an unpredictable way.

To be sure, different development indicators – per capita GDP, literacy, electrification, and so on – yield different maps, showing a number of interesting deviations from the general pattern outlined above. Such anomalies will be discussed as they come up. For starters, however, consider an indicator that closely follows India’s basic developmental split: underweight (i.e., inadequately nourished) women. As the accompanying map shows, every state within the “poverty belt” of the north-center shows higher levels of female malnutrition than any state elsewhere, with the single exception of little Tripura in the highly variable far northeast.

The causes and consequences of India’s developmental divide will be taken up in detail over the next few posts. As a historical note, it is important to note that the current map represents an inversion of the traditional norm. Over the ages, north-central India has formed the political, demographic, and economic core zone of the subcontinent. In particular, wealth and power were concentrated in the middle and lower Ganges Valley, a zone of fertile soil, abundant moisture, and easy transportation. Today this area, comprising the states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, is India’s – and hence the world’s – heart of poverty.

It is common knowledge that China and India are the two most populous countries in the world. What is less commonly appreciated is the fact that they demographically tower over almost every other sovereign state. Whereas China has some 1.3 billion inhabitants and India is closing in on 1.2 billion, only two other countries have more that 200 million people: the United States (309 million) and Indonesia (234 million).

One of the most illustrative portrayals of India and China’s demographic dominance is a recent Wikipedia map with the awkward title of “Largest World Subdivisions Population.” It depicts the 51 most populous political subdivisions in the world, 39 of which are located in India and China. The number 51 was evidently selected in order to include Texas. If 53 selections had been made, India would have had two more entries. The only other countries with more than one subdivision on the list are Indonesia (East Java and Central Java), Ethiopia (Oromia and Amhara), Bangladesh (Dhaka and Rajshahi), Pakistan (Punjab and Sindh) and the United States (California and Texas). The top 21 entries, moreover, are all in either India or China (with England coming in at 22). (Note: the cartographer has neglected to include the two Bangladeshi subdivisions on the map. Several other deviations between the map and the list also occur.)

In terms of their basic geographical scope as well as their population, India and China are comparable to Europe as a whole rather that to any given European country. India also shows levels of cultural and economic diversity equal to that found in the European Union. But because India is a single country, such diversity is often overlooked.

Beginning next week, Geocurrents will explore Indian diversity, presenting a series of state-level maps on the social and economic development of the country.

Latin American is noted for its economic inequality, the gap between rich and poor generally being considered the largest in the world. Class inequity often has a strong regional component; Brazil and Mexico are well known for their income variation from state to state. Less appreciated is the fact that Argentina is equally skewed. Its wealthiest province, Santa Cruz, produces more than fifteen times the value of goods and services per person as Chaco, its poorest ($30,496 vs. $2,015 in nominal terms). Such stark disparities in production do not translate directly into differences in income, but median monthly salaries do vary by more than 100 percent from province to province.

Argentina’s geographical divide is threefold, featuring a poor north (moderately populated), a middle-income (and more densely populated) east-center, and a wealthy (and lightly populated) south. The east central region holds the national core, focused on Buenos Aires. The official city of Buenos Aires (population 3 million) is Argentina’s third most productive subdivision, but the rest of the metro area, with an additional 10 million, does not rank so well. Buenos Aires Province, which includes the outer city as well as a good part of the country’s agricultural heartland, is below the national average in per capita GDP. The same is true of the major manufacturing center of Cordoba, as well as the settlements along the foot of the Andes in the west-center and northwest. The wealthy provinces are all found in the sparsely settled south. As an arid region with ample water (produced by meltwater from the Andes), the south’s prosperity is based on mining and energy extraction. In the top two provinces, Santa Cruz and Neuquén, mining accounts for 47 percent and 43 percent of economic output respectively.

Pronounced regional economic disparities often correlate with spatially distinctive voting patterns, as poor regions support one candidate while wealthy ones favor another. This is not the case in Argentina. In the 2007 presidential election, victor Cristina Kirchner fared equally well in some of the poorest and richest provinces. She did lose one wealthy subdivision, the city of Buenos Aires (see inset on the map above), and she took the second most productive province, Neuquén, with a plurality of only 37 percent.

Neuquén’s split vote in the 2007 presidential election was no surprise. Politics in the province is strongly regional, with many voters shunning national political parties. Every gubernatorial election in the province since 1961 has been won by the Neuquén People's Movement. This movement, founded by Lebanese-born Elías Canaán Sapag, emerged out of a feeling of neglect and exploitation by the central government. Until 1955, Neuquén was a territory rather than a province; this status allowed Buenos Aires to manage, and profit from, its rich natural resources. The Neuquén People's Movement has pushed with some success for a federal approach to government, hoping to empower provincial administration.

If current plans come to fruition, Neuquén’s economy may soon get another boost. In July 2010, the Spanish energy company Repsol YPF announced that one of its subsidiaries would begin drilling South America’s first shale-gas well in the province, using the new extraction techniques have vastly increased the reserves of natural gas in North America. Argentina depends heavily on natural gas for its electricity supply, yet is short on reserves; shortages in 2004 caused a serious energy crisis in Buenos Aires. Shale-gas also has huge drawbacks, being highly polluting. Neuquén has recently been trumpeting its tourism potential, which will surely come into conflict with the new energy enterprise.

The map of Central America’s per capita GDP posted last week showed Costa Rica and Panama in the highest category, easily outpacing the other economies of the region. What it concealed is the fact that Panama is the richer of the two countries by this criterion. According to the World Bank, Panama’s per capita GDP (in Purchasing Power Parity) was a bit over $13,000 in 2009, whereas Costa Rica’s was just above $11,000. The Panamanian economy has exhibited solid growth over most of the past decade, reaching annual increases of total GDP of 8 percent in 2007, 11 percent in 2008, and 9 percent even in dismal 2009.

Panama’s recent economic expansion has multiple roots. Banking has boomed in an atmosphere of minimal regulation, low taxes, and strict privacy protections (one recent business report maintains that Panama has “the best banking secrecy laws” in the world today). The use of the US dollar as the country’s official currency has not hurt. Financial wealth, in turn, has given Panama City a striking skyline of high-rises despite its relatively small size (1.2 million in the metropolitan area). Panama also contains the Colón Free Trade Zone, the second largest open commerce zone in the world. Optimism about the future of the Panama Canal has further propelled the economy. Capacity is expected to double when the current expansion project is completed in 2014.

Rising Panamanian prosperity has attracted international attention. In June 2010, South Korea and Panama pledged to build a bilateral free trade agreement. Even in advance of such an agreement, this small country of 3.4 million – the least populous Spanish-speaking nation in the Americas – has emerged as South Korea’s third largest trading partner in the region, trailing only Mexico and Brazil.

Although Panama’s free-trade approach to economic development has brought major gains, the benefits have by no means been spread evenly. Assessed by its GINI coefficient,* Panama ranks 14th in the world for economic inequality. The national poverty rate is nearly 30 percent, almost half of the rural population falls below the poverty line, and roughly a quarter is considered extremely poor. Among Panama’s indigenous population, the poverty rate is over 80 percent.

Indigenous Panamanians, who constitute 6.7 percent of the country’s population, may be economically marginalized, but most of them have an enviable political position. In Panama’s five comarcas indígenas, native groups enjoy considerable autonomy. The oldest, Kuna Yala, was established in 1938, following the largely successful Kuna rebellion of 1925. Kuna Yala is governed by the Kuna General Congress, consisting of one representative from each of the comarca’s 68 communities. Its purview includes tourism, which has experienced considerable success. Kuna Yala has numerous natural and cultural attractions, which the Congress seeks to enhance. The Kuna people are noted internationally for setting up and largely running their own biosphere reserve, known as PEMASKY (Proyecto de Estudio para el Manejo de Areas Silvestres de Kuna Yala).

Despite such generally successful institutions, relations between the indigenous peoples of Panama and the larger national society remain strained. Tensions have recently focused on the Naso people of the northwest, a small group (population 3,500) supposedly governed by its own king. Unlike the larger indigenous nations of Panama, the Naso have no autonomous region. On June 3, 2010, Naso leaders submitted a petition to the American Commission on Human Rights claiming extreme discrimination and focusing on hydroelectric developments in their territory. Their 175-page petition, filed by the Washington DC law firm of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, claims that the projects will "probably result in cultural genocide of the Naso, since their culture, spiritual life and existence are threatened by foreign investors motivated only by financial gain (...). Irreparable damage is being done at this time to the Naso community, and must be stopped pending a decision based on the merits of this petition."

* The GINI Coefficient is one of the most widely used statistical measurement of income inequality; it will be further discussed later this week in Geocurrents.

Nicaragua, the poorest country in continental North America by a good margin, sends immigrants not only northward into Mexico and the United States but also southward into Costa Rica. The economic disparity along Nicaragua’s lightly policed southern border is steep and Costa Rica, unlike Nicaragua, is known for its political stability, effective government, and high levels of social well-being. Nicaraguans have been moving south for some time, the flow accelerating with every natural and political disaster at home. Most estimates put the number of people of Nicaraguan origin in Costa Rica at about 10 percent of the total population; roughly half are undocumented.

Costa Ricans tend to disparage “Nicas,” blaming them for crime and stressed social services. In 2005, the mauling death of a suspected Nicaraguan thief by two dogs generated a diplomatic episode. Reports claimed that Costa Rican bystanders, including members of the police, simply watched as the animals ripped the man apart. A few hard-core Costa Rican nationalists defended the attack. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights report on the incident is worth quoting at length:

“According to the State of Nicaragua, ‘in certain sectors there has arisen a marked climate of verbal violence, intolerance, and xenophobia as is apparent from publications produced by groups interested in stirring up hate and even violence against Nicaraguans in Costa Rica.’ … [I]n the days following the death of Mr. Canda Mairena a number of ‘jokes’ and xenophobic displays appeared on different Internet web sites … An electronic mail message dated November 11, 2005 says, ‘Due to the recent events of bravery and heroism that showed that the dog is the Costa Rican's best friend (today more than ever), all of the below signed wish to present to the legislative assembly a bill to change the yiguirro [the national bird of Costa Rica] thanks to the heroic dogs Oso and Hunter “Rottweller” (sic), who took the initiative, cast fear aside, and redefined Costa Rican culture and valor against the invasion of the neighbors to the north.’”

In 2006, Costa Rica implemented a stringent immigration reform. As reported in the Los Angeles Times, “Costa Rica's new immigration law is aimed largely at those who profit from undocumented workers. It makes human trafficking a crime punishable by as much as six years in prison. And it significantly increases fines on Costa Ricans caught employing illegal immigrants -- to $3,600 per violation, up from as little as $10…”

Costa Rica’s current immigration news story concerns China rather than Nicaragua. Some 600 Chinese workers recently came to Costa Rica to work on a new national sports stadium, financed by Beijing as a favor for Costa Rica dropping Taiwanese recognition in 2007. As Chinese construction firms subsequently moved on to build an apartment complex in San Jose, the call went out for more Chinese workers. Costa Rica’s Ministry of Labor countered that there are plenty of qualified Costa Ricans who could be employed instead. On June 27, 2010, Costa Rica's ambassador to Beijing lodged an official protest against Chinese pressure on his country to allow in the additional workers.

Many Costa Ricans are apparently irritated with China. As one commenter put it, “With roughly 1.5 billion people the next thing will be the waters being over-fished and no sharks anywhere to be found, which is already happening anyway. All for a free stadium. … Time to tell them 'a Dios muchaco', and apologize to/make friends again with the Taiwanese, who were generous without all of the stings attached.”

On the global scale, Mexico is a middle-income country, a fact lost on most Americans. According to the IMF, it ranks 60 out of 184 in per capita Gross Domestic Product. Measured in purchasing power parity (PPP), Mexico produces roughly $13,600* worth of goods and services per person per year, a figure comparable to those of Malaysia, Lebanon, and Turkey. While substantially lower than that of the United States ($46,300), much less those of Luxembourg ($78,300) or Qatar ($83,800), Mexico’s per person output towers over those of truly destitute countries, such as Zimbabwe ($355) or the Democratic Republic of Congo ($332). (Per capita GDP, as discussed previously in Geocurrents, is a vexed measurement of wealth and poverty, but it does give a general sense of economic development.)

Mexico’s economic output varies substantially from one region to another. The country’s wealthiest subdivision, the Federal District, produces more than six times the value of goods and services per capita as the poorest state, Chiapas. The basic geographical pattern is one of relative prosperity in much of the core area of Mexico City and through most of the north, coupled with much lower levels of economic activity in the south, particularly in the states of Chiapas, Oaxaca, and Guerrero. But even Mexico’s poorest states are relatively well off when compared with nearby countries further to the south; the per capita GDP of Chiapas is more than three times larger than that of Nicaragua. Overall, Mexico’s economic figures are comparable to those of Central and Eastern Europe, as is evident in the chart posted above (the chart takes a sampling of Mexican states, ranging from the richest to the poorest, and pairs them with European countries of roughly equal output).

Relatively high per capita GDP can coexist with widespread poverty if income distribution is highly skewed or if profits are monopolized by groups from outside of the region. Such a disconnection between per capita GDP and basic economic wellbeing is especially notable in two Mexican states, Quintana Roo and Campeche, both located on the Yucatan Peninsula. These states have an elevated rank in regard to both economic production and, as is evident in the 2000 CIMMYT maps posted above, deprivation. The explanation seems to lie in the states’ particular patterns of economic development. Quintana Roo has profited massively from the mega resorts of the Cancun area, but the fruits of such development had not spread widely by the year 2000. The same seems to be true in regard to the profits flowing from the oil industry of Campeche. It would be interesting to see the extent of poverty reduction in these two states over the past ten years.

Because Mexico is so much more prosperous than its southern neighbors, it attracts large numbers of Central American immigrants, most of them arriving illegally. As a 2008 WorldFocus article reported, “According to Mexico’s National Institute of Migration, 2 million documented and undocumented cross Mexico’s southern border a year. The majority of these undocumented immigrants are Guatemaltecos, followed by Hondurans, Salvadorians, and … Nicaraguans.” Many of these immigrants are ultimately headed to the United States, but a substantial number seek work in Mexico, much closer to home. Mexico has often treated its own undocumented workers harshly. In late June 2010, the Mexican government announced a new program, dubbed “Summer 2010,” designed to increase patrols along both its northern and southern boundaries, but also to provide humanitarian assistance for would-be border-jumpers. According to a recent article, “during this special summer operation, immigration officials will try to dissuade migrants from continuing their journey, insofar as they will be exposed to dehydration due to long walks in temperatures of more than 40 degrees Celsius [104 °F].

*In nominal terms (measured in currency equivalents rather than purchasing power), Mexico’s per capita GDP is only about $8,100, but it still ranks 61 out of 181 countries, Quintana Roo, Campeche

In the American immigration debate, the point is often made on talk radio that Mexicans stream into the United States because their birth rate is so high. Mainstream sources sometimes make the same argument. In June, 2010, Britain’s Prince Charles warned about the “cultural pressures that keep the global birth rate high,” arguing that the same is true in “Mumbai, Cairo or Mexico City; wherever you look, the world’s population is increasing fast.”

The population of Mexico City is certainly increasing, but not because the country’s birth rate is elevated. Mexico’s total fertility rate (TFR), or the number of children born to an average woman, is actually very close to 2.1—essentially the same as that of the United States. If Mexico’s population continues to expand, it is because its fertility drop is so recent. At its current birth rate, the Mexican population will soon stabilize even without emigration to the United States. As a developing country, Mexico is hardly alone in this situation. Mauritius’s TFR is 1.9, Thailand’s is 1.8, and Trinidad and Tobago’s is 1.6, all well below replacement level.

In Mexico, fertility patterns vary significantly from state to state, as is to be expected. The map that I have constructed above using demographic data from the 2000 census shows a distinct regional pattern, with relatively high fertility rates in the south contrasting sharply with lower rates in both the north and center (including greater Mexico City). The correlation with socio-economic development is marked, as is made clear by comparing this map with that of Mexico’s Human Development Index. But even Mexico’s least developed states have relatively low birth rates by historical and global standards, with only Guerrero exceeding 3.0 in 2000.

Urbanization as well as development correlates with reduced fertility. Consider the state of Mexico, the country’s most populous political subdivision, with more than 14 million inhabitants. This state encompasses many of the poorer parts of Greater Mexico City, and thus has a per capita level of economic output substantially lower the national average ($8,900 for the country of Mexico vs. $6,200 for the state of Mexico, in nominal GDP). Yet the state’s birthrate is well below the national average, having been under the replacement level even in 2000. The state of Mexico also sends a disproportionate number of emigrants to the United States, “making up about 75.7% of the total Mexican population that migrates,” according to the unsupported figures given in the Wikipedia. (Intriguingly, Mexican-Americans have significantly higher birth rates than Mexicans. In 2007, Hispanics in general in the United States had a TFR of 2.9 in 2007, as compared to 2.1 for blacks, 1.9 for Asians, and 1.86 for whites.)

At the global scale as well, Prince Charles’s insinuation that contemporary urban surges in the Third World result from elevated birthrates is misleading. Cities have fed on migration from the countryside since the dawn of urbanization 5,000 years ago; before the 1800s, death rates in urban areas almost always exceeded birth rates. Although modern methods of hygiene now allow cities to sustain themselves, urban fertility rates usually remain substantially lower than rural fertility rates. If global demographic stabilization is the goal, one should champion rather than disparage urbanization. Of course there are other grounds for opposing the further expansion of such megacities as Mumbai, Cairo, or Mexico City, but urban population growth should not blind us to the dramatic downward shift in many developing countries’ overall reproductive rates.

As mentioned the other day, Melanesia has long had a negative reputation in the Western cultural imagination, quite in contrast to its neighboring Pacific region of Polynesia. In the 1800s and early 1900s, disparagement of Melanesia typically focused on cultural practices deemed savage, especially cannibalism. Cannibalism was noted in some parts of Polynesia, particularly Samoa, but not to the same extant as in many parts of Melanesia.

In the 1960s and 1970s, anthropologists began reappraising received perceptions of savagery among indigenous peoples. Reports of such practices, many scholars now argued, were colored by racial prejudice and cultural condescension, resulting in grotesque exaggeration if not outright lies. Cannibalism in particular came under scrutiny. In 1980, Oxford University Press published William Arens’ The Man-Eating Myth: Anthropology and Anthropophagy, which argued that systematic, culturally sanctioned cannibalism was a myth, perpetuated by bigoted Western explorers, missionaries, and scholars. Not a single credible first-hand account of the practice, he argued, could be located. Arens’ book made a significant impression; as a graduate student in cultural geography in the 1980s, I was taught that cannibalism had never been anything but an isolated, aberrant occurrence. Indigenous peoples, according to the newly prevailing orthodoxy of cultural romanticism, lived in harmony with both the natural environment and their fellow humans.

The Arens thesis has not fared well over the past 30 years. Credible reports of systematic cannibalism turned out to be numerous, and direct archeological evidence is now firmly established. Even more problematic for adherents of 1960s-style cultural romanticism is the fact that a number of indigenous peoples themselves have no doubt that their ancestors were cannibals. Many are ashamed of this heritage, and some even fear that it generated curses that continue to plague their societies. As a result, one Fijian village organized a ceremony of apology in 2003, focused on the consumption of the missionary Thomas Baker and his fellow travelers in 1867. According to one participant, “we ate everything but his boots.”

The 2003 ritual of atonement was a massive event, attended by more than 600 people, including the prime minister of the country. Eleven descendants of Thomas Baker also joined the ceremony, where they were asked for, and granted, forgiveness. As the BBC reported, “They were given the traditional drink of kava, and attended ceremonies on Thursday, at which they were to take part in a ‘symbolic cutting of the chain of curse and bondage over the village.’"